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BULK TRANSFERS: WHAT HATH THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE WROUGHT?
LEONARD LAKIN*
INTRODUCTION
Today, the law of bulk transfers is governed in all states, except
Louisiana, by Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code.' The
purpose of this commentary is to examine the provisions and evaluate
the effectiveness of Article 6 and to analyze the judicial response in
the approximately twenty-five cases that have construed Article 6.
The experience and approach of the then forty-eight states, each
of which previously had enacted what was generally termed a Bulk
Sales Act,2 provided a foundation upon which the draftsmen of Article
6' were able to build. Aggressive lobbying by the National Associa-
* Associate Professor of Law, Bernard M. Baruch College, City University
of New York; B.B.A., City College of New York, 1953; J.D., New York University
School of Law, 1956; Member New York and Hawaii Bars; Co-Author of L. LAKIN
& H. BERGER, A GUIDE TO SECURED TRANSACTIONS (1970) ; Author of numerous other
articles and lecturer to professional groups.
1. Article 6, entitled "Bulk Transfers," consists of eleven sections. Although,
shorter than the other substantive articles of the Code, Article 6 is considerably
more detailed than the old bulk sales laws. Unless otherwise indicated, all Uniform
Commercial Code citations contained herein are to the 1972 Official Text.
2. The term "Bulk Sales Acts" is a generic term descriptive of a class of
statutes designed to prevent the defrauding of creditors by the secret sale in bulk
of substantially all of a merchant's stock of goods. See 27 C.J. Fraudulent Conveyances
§ 881 (1922). The various Bulk Sales Acts were passed in rapid succession between
1896 and 1913. See generally Billig, Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Economic Adjust-
ment, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 72 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Billig]. Another writer on
this subject categorized the principal forms of Bulk Sales Acts as the Pennsylvania,
New York, Connecticut, or Montana form. W. MONTGOMERY, BULK SALES, A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE STATUTES AND DECISIONS 1, 11 (1925) [hereinafter
cited as MONTGOMERY].
3. Professor Charles Bunn of the University of Wisconsin Law School, the
Reporter for Article 6, began his work in 1947 and carried the Article through its
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tion of Credit Men 4 provided the impetus for the adoption of these
acts by the several states. The Association was concerned with the
increasingly frequent occurrence of dishonest debtors defeating their
creditors by effective bulk sales to bona fide purchasers, vanishing
with the proceeds, and leaving their unsuspecting creditors unpaid.5
Those bulk sales statutes were not designed to prohibit a merchant
from selling his stock of merchandise and fixtures to another but
only to require that the seller's creditors be given notice of the pro-
posed sale. The statutory purpose of requiring notice to the seller's
creditors was to afford them an opportunity to examine the facts
concerning the sale, to determine whether the proposed transfer was
to be made in good faith and for adequate consideration, and then
to protect their interests in accordance with local procedural rules.6
Under the bulk sales statutes, once due notice of the proposed sale
was given, the transfer could take place in most states with no more
formality than required for any ordinary sale. However, even if
adequate notice of the proposed transfer was given, the transfer
could still be challenged by the seller's creditors under the general
provisions of the law of fraudulent conveyances, assuming the seller's
intent in transferring his stock in merchandise was to hinder, delay
or defraud creditors.7 Thus, what existed under pre-Code law was
final draft in 1951 when the two sponsoring organizations, the American Law
Institute and the National Conference on Uniform State Laws, approved the Uniform
Commercial Code.
4. For a history of the work of the National Association of Credit Men in
promoting adoption of bulk sales acts, see Billig, supra note 2, at 81-99.
5. The following cases, concerning bulk sales in which the creditors alleged
that they were defrauded, are indicative of the situation giving rise to the need
for bulk sales legislation: Nelms v. Steiner, 113 Ala. 562, 22 So. 435 (1897) ; Carl
& Tobey Co. v. Beal & Fletcher Grocer Co., 64 Ark. 373, 42 S.W. 664 (1897);
Bliss v. Crosier, 159 Mass. 498, 34 N.E. 1075 (1893); Schloss v. Estey, 114 Mich.
429, 72 N.W. 264 (1897) ; Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 330, 346, 75 N.E. 404, 410
(1905) (Vann, J., dissenting) ; Fisher v. Stout, 74 App. Div. 97, 77 N.Y.S. 945
(1902). See also G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 309
(rev. ed. 1940).
6. Because the various Bulk Sales Acts placed serious restrictions on the
free right to transfer property, attempts were made in certain states to have the
Bulk Sales Act declared unconstitutional. The courts, relying upon the police power
of the state, generally held the various Acts constitutional. E.g., Kett v. Masker,
86 N.J.L. 97, 90 A. 243 (1914) ; Steele, Hopkins & Meredith Co. v. Miller, 92 Ohio
115, 110 N.E. 648 (1915) ; William Tackabera Co. v. German State Bank, 39 S.D. 185,
163 N.W. 709 (1917); Cantrell v. Ring, 125 Tenn. 472, 145 S.W. 166 (1912); Contra,
Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22 (1904).
7. See Weintraub & Levin, Bulk Sales Law and Adequate Protection of
Creditors, 65 HARV. L. REV. 418, 419 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Weintraub &
Levin], Note, Transactions Within the Bulk Transfer Act and Creditors Protected
Thereby, 43 IoWA L. REV. 572 (1958).
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a patchwork quilt of forty-eight state legislative acts embroidered with
approximately two thousand judicial decisions that could not be re-
conciled by rhyme or reason."
Against this legislative backdrop and judicial framework, the
draftsmen of the Bulk Transfers Article undertook to bring order out
of chaos 9 and to provide a uniform law that would protect creditors
against two common forms of commercial fraud: (1) the merchant-
debtor who sells his stock in trade to a friend for less than fair value,
obtains a composition of creditors, and hopes eventually to re-enter the
business and (2) the merchant-debtor who liquidates his stock in trade
and absconds with the proceeds, leaving his creditors unpaid.'" As
noted in the Official Comment to Article 6, "[t]he second form of
fraud ... represents the major bulk sales risk, and its prevention is the
central purpose of the existing bulk sales laws and of this Article.""
Thus, functionally, the Bulk Transfers Article is designed to afford
creditors a reasonable opportunity to secure and collect their claims."
WHAT CONSTITUTES A BULK TRANSFER
Article 6 defines a bulk transfer as "any transfer in bulk and not
in the ordinary course of the transferor's business of a major part of
8. See Billig, Article 6 - Order Out of Chaos; A Bulk Transfer Article
Emerges, 1952 Wisc. L. REv. 312, 316.
9. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-101, Comment 1: "This Article attempts to
simplify and make uniform the bulk sales laws of the states that adopt this Act."
See generally Weintraub & Levin, A Functional Approach to Article 6 of the Code.
in 2 P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 22.03[1] (1968) [hereinafter cited as Weintraub &
Levin in COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTSJ.
10. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-101, Comment 2. The first form of com-
mercial fraud is within the purview of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
which is not affected by Article 6. The second form of commercial fraud is the evil
that the various Bulk Sales Acts were designed to prevent.
11. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-101, Comment 4. The prophylactic
mechanism contained in the Code, at least in those states not adopting section 6-106
providing for application of proceeds (see notes 160-175 infra and accompanying text),
is the notice requirement. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-105, Comment 1. Beyond
this, a creditor of a bulk transferor has no protection under Article 6 and must
avail himself of the protection provided by other local statutes such as the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act. See 3 R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULK
TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 15.04[3] (1972) [hereinafter
cited as DUESENBERG & KING]; W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 831-32 (1964) [hereinafter cited as HAWKLAND];
Uniform Commercial Code Commentary, Article 6: Rights of an Aggrieved Creditor
of a Bulk Transferor, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 281, 285 n.26 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Commentary].
12. See, Weintraub & Levin in COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 9,§ 22.04[2]; Lamey, How to Handle a Bulk Transfer, 19 Bus. LAw. 67 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Lamey].
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the materials, supplies, merchandise or other inventory . . . of an
enterprise subject to this Article."' 3 Inherent in this definition is the
requirement that there be an actual transfer 4 of property. Addition-
ally, the Code expressly provides that the transfer must be "not in
the ordinary course of the transferor's business." The definition of a
bulk transfer is further restricted by the quantitative requirement that
the transfer be of "a major part" of the described property and by
the qualitative requirement that the property transferred in bulk be
"materials, supplies, merchandise or other inventory."' 5
Transfer
In Danning v. Daylin, Inc., 6 the Ninth Circuit, construing
California law, considered the question of whether an exchange of
inventory and fixtures for other inventory and fixtures constituted a
transfer within the meaning of subsection 6-102(1). The transferor's
trustee in bankruptcy challenged the exchange for noncompliance with
the Bulk Transfers Article. The transferee defended on the theory
that the exchange, being merely a replacement of assets of equivalent
value and, thus, causing no depletion of inventory, did not operate to
the detriment of the transferor's creditors. The transferee, therefore,
contended that the exchange did not constitute a transfer under Article
6. The court, relying upon the scheme and purpose of Article 6, as
well as extrinsic definitions of the term "transfer,"' 7 rejected the
transferee's argument:
Article 6 requires, however, that creditors be allowed to police
bulk sales, to make certain that the consideration paid in return
is indeed equal in value to the inventory transferred. [Transferee]
would have the transferor act as the "policeman" of his own sale.
The dangers of a bulk transfer - either fraud or mere in-
adequacy of consideration - can as easily occur with an ex-
13. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-102(1). The words "in bulk" are not
defined in the Code. However, the term "in bulk" would seem to describe a sale
"where separating, counting, measuring, weighing or dividing in parcels, packages
or barrels does not take place but where the mass and the heap are sold as one."
Feldstein v. Fusco, 205 App. Div. 806, 809, 201 N.Y.S. 4, 6 (1923), rev'd on other
grounds, 238 N.Y. 58, 143 N.E. 790 (1924).
14. The term "bulk transfer" is much broader than the frequently used pre-Code
term "bulk sale." While every sale is a transfer, not every transfer is a sale. For
example, a gift on a lease involves a transfer but not a sale.
15. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-102(1).
16. 488 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1973).
17. Specifically, the court stated: "[W]hile the term 'transfer' is not expressly
defined in the California Commercial Code, it is defined elsewhere in California law
and the Bankruptcy Act to include an exchange .... Bankruptcy Act Section 1(30),
11 U.S.C. Section 1 (30) (1970)." Id. at 188.
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change of assets as with a cash sale. When creditors have advance
notice of a bulk sale, either for cash or assets, they can investigate
before it is completed and then determine whether they should
intervene. That the trustee in bankruptcy subsequently receives
the exchanged assets, as he did here, is of small consolation to
creditors if the assets are of less value or salability than those
looked to by the creditors wfien they extended credit.' 8
Quantitative Requirement
Although subsection 6-102(1) defines a bulk transfer in terms
of "a major part" of the described property, neither the Code nor the
Official Comment offers any insight into what constitutes "a major
part." Resort to the Bulk Sales Acts yields no more than four states
that employed either the same or similar language in their Acts."9 In
Zenith Radio Distributing Corp. v. Mateer,2 ° the only case interpret-
ing a Bulk Sales Act utilizing this term, the court held that the sale
of fifty percent of a business did not involve a major part of the
seller's business.2 This holding was premised on the court's adher-
ence to what it characterized as the clear and definite meaning of the
word "major" - "greater or larger."22 While one commentator has
suggested that the draftsmen of Article 6, by employing the term
''major part," did not intend to adopt a standard of greater than
fifty percent,23 the dictionary definition of "major" would seem to sup-
port the Illinois court's conclusion in Zenith Radio.24 Thus, more
than fifty percent of the described property must be transferred to
bring the transfer within the provisions of Article 6.
The California version of the Uniform Commercial Code sub-
stituted the words "substantial part" for "major part. '25 This modi-
18. Id.
19. Those states were Connecticut, Illinois, Rhode Island and South Carolina.
Commentary, supra note 11, at 281 n.4.
20. 311 Ill. App. 263, 35 N.E.2d 815 (1941).
21. Id. at 264, 35 N.E.2d at 816.
22. Id.
23. Bennett asserts that the draftsmen of Article 6, preferring to have courts
examine each case individually and determine as a question of fact whether the
requisite "major test" is met, neither adopted nor rejected the standard articulated in
Zenith Radio. Bennett, Bulk Transfers Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 19
KAN. L. REV. 709, 714-15 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Bennett].
24. "Major" is defined as "greater in number, quantity, or extent ..
WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971).
Various commentators, citing Zenith Radio, have agreed that the term "major
part" contemplates a transfer of more than fifty percent of the described property.
Weintraub & Levin in COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 9, § 22.06[1][c];
DUESENBERG & KING, supra note 11, § 15.02[1]; HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at
835-36; Lamey, supra note 12, at 68.
25. CAL. Comm. CODE § 6102(2) (West 1964).
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fication was necessary to preserve prior California case law holding
that sales of approximately six percent, 26 fifteen percent,2 7 and sixteen
percent 28 of the total inventory constituted a "substantial part," thereby
invoking the Bulk Sales Act. Two California Code decisions have
held that sales of five percent2 9 and twenty-five percent3" of total in-
ventory were substantial parts of the transferors' inventories and,
thus, subject to the bulk transfer provisions of the California Com-
mercial Code.
Moreover, the Code does not state whether a "major part" of
the described property is to be determined on the basis of the value
or the quantity of the described property. The more reasonable view,
however, is that this term refers to the dollar value of the described
property.3 ' While this position is favored by the Permanent Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 there have been no re-
ported Code decisions on this question. In enacting Article 6, Idaho,3"
Iowa,34 and Wisconsin 35 avoided this ambiguity by adding the words
26. Markwell & Co. v. Lynch, 114 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1940).
27. Jubas v. Sampsell, 185 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1950).
28. Schainman v. Dean, 24 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1928).
29. Reed v. Anglo Scandinavian Corp., 298 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Cal. 1969).
30. Danning v. Daylin, Inc., 488 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1973).
31. Under the bulk sales statutes having similar statutory language, the courts
generally adopted a comparison of value test, comparing the value of the stock of
inventory transferred with the value of the stock of inventory remaining in the
transferor's possession. See Billig & Branch, The Problem of Transfers Under Bulk
Sales Laws: A Study of Absolute Transfers and Liquidating Trusts, 35 MICH. L.
REV. 732, 742-45 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Billig & Branch]. Some courts,
however, did not apply this test to the transfer of an independent unit of a chain
business. When such a transfer occurred, a court may have considered the value
of the goods of each unit as opposed to the value of the several units in their
entirety. E.g., Young v. Lemieux, 79 Conn. 434, 65 A. 436 (1907), aff'd 211 U.S.
489 (1909). See generally Weintraub & Levin in COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra
note 9, § 22.07; Lamey, supra note 12, at 69. Furthermore, certain courts held that
successive transfers, not large enough individually to be subject to the bulk sales
statutes, were to be considered as one transfer in determining whether a major or
substantial part of the stock had been transferred. Thus, a sale of one type of
stock and equipment to one party and a sale of another type of stock and equipment
to a different party, the two sales constituting a major part of the seller's business
and not being made in the ordinary course of business, were subject to the bulk
sales law and were void where there was noncompliance with such law. E.g.,
Corrigan v. Miller, 338 Ill. App. 212, 86 N.E.2d 853 (1949). See also 3 R. ANDERSON,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-102(2), at 443-44 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as ANDERSON]; Raff, Bulk Transfers Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17
RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 108 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Raff].
32. See Commentary, supra note 11, at 281 n.4.
33. IDAHO CODE § 28-6-102 (1967).
34. IOWA CODE § 554.6102 (1967).
35. WIS. STAT. § 406.102 (1964).
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"in value" following "major part," thereby plainly adopting the dollar
value standard. The Permanent Editorial Board, adhering to its
position that "major part" means dollar value, labeled this statutory
amendment "redundant." 6
Qualitative Requirement
Qualitatively, subsection 6-102(1) mandates that a transfer, to
be within Article 6, involve "the materials, supplies, merchandise or
other inventory" of an enterprise governed by the Article. Thus,
transfers of investment securities, money, accounts receivable, chattel
paper, contract rights, negotiable instruments, and things in action are
not within the scope of Article 6." The courts, with rare exception,
have had no difficulty recognizing the foregoing differences."8 For
example, in Credithrift Financial Corp. v. Guggenheim, 9 the court
properly held that a transfer by a small loan company of its business,
consisting of promissory notes, furniture and fixtures, and a small
loan operating license, was not controlled by Article 6 because the
"promissory notes and other items included in the transfer were not
such 'materials, supplies, merchandise or other inventory' as are kept
for sale in the ordinary course of business of a small loan company.'
The Code use of the phrase "materials, supplies, merchandise or
other inventory" is more explicit and broader than the language of
36. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REP. No. 2
at 105 (1965). For a well reasoned argument that the additional words, "in value"
are material, see DUESENBERG & KING, supra note 11, § 15.02[l]. The authors cite
the hypothetical case of a jeweler whose inventory consists quantitatively of a major
portion of inexpensive costume jewelry and a minor portion of valuable jewelry,
which value exceeds the value of the costume jewelry. The authors suggest that
the Code's omission of the value test in subsection 6-102(1) leaves open the
possibility that a court might, contrary to the view of the Permanent Editorial
Board, use the quantitative test rather than the value test. Interestingly, no Code
decisions on this quantitative value test have been found. The prudent counsel,
however, should comply with Article 6 when the transferor is transferring a major
part of his inventory, measured quantatively, while retaining a minor part of his
inventory, which exceeds in value the major part transferred.
37. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-102, Comment 3. The stated reason for
their exclusion: "such transfers are dealt with in other articles, and are not
believed to carry any major bulk sales risk."
38. E.g., Sta-Rite Industries, Inc. v. Taylor, 16 Ariz. App. 230, 492 P.2d 726
(1972) (sale and dissolution of partnership); Macke Co. v. Pizza of Gaithersburg,
Inc., 259 Md. 479, 270 A.2d 645 (1970) (sale of assets of vending company,
consisting of contract rights with third parties, held outside Article 6).
39. 232 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1970).
40. Id. at 401. The various bulk sales laws were generally held not to apply
to intangibles such as notes receivable. See Annot., 168 A.L.R. 762, 786-87 (1947)
and cases cited therein.
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the various Bulk Sales Acts; the pre-Code acts referred to "stock in
trade,".41 "stock of goods, wares and merchandise, '42 "stock of mer-
chandise,"4 and "merchandise or other goods and chattels of the
vendor's business." 4 The preceding phrases, thus, limited the applica-
bility of the Bulk Sales Acts to transfers involving finished goods.4"
The term "inventory," as used in the Code, expands the scope of the
bulk transfer law. The Official Comment to the Code definition of
"inventory" provides: "[t]he principal test to determine whether
goods are inventory is that they are held for immediate or ultimate
sale."4 In accordance with this test, both raw materials and goods-
in-process, as well as finished goods, are brought within the ambit of
Article 6.47
In addition, Article 6 stipulates that a transfer of equipment48
may, under limited circumstances, constitute a bulk transfer. Subsec-
tion 6-102(2) states: "A transfer of a substantial part of the equip-
ment . . .of such an enterprise is a bulk transfer if it is made in con-
nection with a bulk transfer of inventory, but not otherwise. '49 Here
again, a quantitative determination must be made in each case. Appar-
ently, a "substantial part," as used in connection with the transfer of
41. MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 23 (citing three states using this term).
42. Id. (citing twelve states and the District of Columbia using this term).
43. Id. (citing thirty states using this term).
44. Id. (citing two states using this term).
45. MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 24.
46. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-109, Comment 3.
47. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-109(4), which states that goods are
"'inventory' if they are held by a person who holds them for sale or lease or to be
furnished under contracts of service or if he has so furnished them, or if they are
raw materials, work in process or materials used or consumed in a business." The
word "goods" also includes materials used or consumed in a business such as "fuel
to be used in operations, scrap metal produced in the course of manufacture, and
containers to be used to package the goods." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-109,
Comment 3.
48. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-109(2) defines "equipment" as goods that
are "used or bought for use primarily in business (including farming or a profession)
or by a debtor who is a non-profit organization or a governmental subdivision or
agency or if the goods are not included in the definitions of inventory, farm
products or consumer goods." Comment 5 thereunder indicates "the principal
definition of equipment is a negative one: goods used in a business (including
farming or a profession) which are not inventory and not farm products. Trucks,
rolling stock, tools, machinery are typical."
49. The California Commercial Code, contrary to the Uniform Commercial Code,
provides that a transfer of equipment may be a bulk transfer even though there is
no transfer of inventory. CAL. COMM. CODE § 6102(2) (West 1964). The Washington
Code has a provision similar to the California modification: "A transfer of all or
substantially all of the equipment of such an enterprise is a bulk transfer whether
or not made in connection -with a bulk transfer of inventory, merchandise, materials
or supplies." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.6-102(2) (1967).
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equipment, may be less than a "major part," the principal standard
for determining whether a transfer of inventory is a bulk transfer.
And, while it is not clear from the language of the Code whether "sub-
stantial part" refers to the value or the quantity of the transferor's
equipment, the more persuasive view holds that value is the litmus
test.5" Typically, a transfer of equipment in bulk will involve trade
fixtures."' Unless made in connection with a transfer of inventory, a
sale of trade fixtures is outside the coverage of Article 6.5" All Nite
Garage, Inc. v. A.A.A. Towing, Inc.,5 3 emphasizes this point by
holding that the sale of a tow truck used to tow disabled or abandoned
vehicles, not made in connection with a bulk transfer of inventory, is
not governed by Article 6."
Enterprises Subject to Article 6
The provisions of Article 6 are restricted to those "enterprises ...
whose principal business is the sale of merchandise from stock, in-
cluding those who manufacture what they sell." 55  Unfortunately,
despite the difficulty of determining the seller's principal business,"
the Code does not define the term "principal business." Nevertheless,
only one Code decision has been found interpreting this phrase.
50. See Weintraub & Levin in COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 9,
§ 22.06[1] [b] nn.52-54 and cases cited therein; Raff, supra note 31, at 108.
51. Some bulk sales legislation covered sales of fixtures. See, e.g., N.Y. Pers.
Prop. Law § 44(1) (repealed 1964). See MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 23-24
wherein the author lists twenty-nine states that specifically included fixtures in their
bulk sales statutes and nineteen states and the District of Columbia that did not
include fixtures in their bulk sales statutes. The Code definition of equipment, supra
note 48, suggests that the word has a far broader meaning than the word "fixtures."
52. See HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at 836. However, whether the bulk transfer
of equipment alone is a fraudulent conveyance must be determined under non-Code
law, typically the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.
53. 85 Nev. 193, 452 P.2d 902 (1969).
54. Id. at 198, 452 P.2d at 905.
55. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-102(3). The term "enterprise" is not defined
in the Code.
56. As stated in DUESENBERG & KING, supra note 11, § 15.02[2]:
What the principal business of the enterprise is may present some difficulty of
interpretation and application. No indication is given in the Code as to how a
determination should be made in this connection. Thus, this is another situation
where the terms are indefinite. A particular enterprise may be selling goods as
a sideline of its major business, but in such a case or in any other case, is one
expected to look at the percentage of the business, the gross receipts, the net
profits, or anything else to determine what is the principal business of the
enterprise in order to see if a particular transfer would fall within the scope
of Article 6?
1975]
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Danning v. Daylin, Inc.5 7 presented the interesting question of
whether a transferor, a retail merchant at the time it purchased its
inventory, ceased to be a retailer by subsequently divesting itself of its
retail business and operating instead as the lessor of a chain of dis-
count stores. The federal district court held that, at the time of the
transfer of the inventory, the transferor was no longer engaged in the
principal business of a retail merchant and, therefore, was not subject
to the bulk transfer law of California. 8 The Ninth Circuit reversed,
stating:
The district court's conclusion emasculates the policies underlying
the bulk transfer statute by allowing [the transferor] to acquire
inventory as a merchant, change its principal business to that of
lessor, and then dispose of its "merchant's inventory" in bulk
without notice.
"While some bulk sales risk exists in [those businesses excluded
from the scope of Article 6], they have in common the fact that
unsecured credit is not commonly extended on the faith of a stock
of merchandise." . . . In the present case, credit was presumably
extended on the faith of [the transferor's] stock. Since protec-
tion of creditors is the main concern of Article 6, [the transferor's]
subsequent change of business to that of a lessor should not affect
its duty to notify creditors who extended credit while it was a
retail merchant.59
Relying upon the rationale that "unsecured credit is not com-
monly extended on the faith of a stock of merchandise,"6 Article 6
departs from several Bulk Sales Acts which had expressly covered
certain specified service enterprises. 6' However, although the drafts-
57. 488 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1973).
58. Id. at 187-88.
59. 488 F.2d at 188 (quoting from UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-102, Comment
2). Additionally, the appellate court noted:
We have found only two cases that have considered situations analogous to
this, and both support our analysis. They held that the mere fact that a
merchant terminates his business or engages in other lines of employment does
not free him from the requirements of a bulk sales statute as applied to the
sale of stock of his former business. Davidson v. Heyman, 243 App. Div. 546,
275 N.Y.S. 870 (1934) 1 Teich v. McAuley, 212 S.W. 979 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
Id.
60. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-102, Comment 2.
61. The Washington Bulk Sales Act, in 1943, was extended to cover restaurants,
cafes, beer parlors, taverns, hotels, clubs, or gasoline stations. WASH. STAT. ANN.
Section 5832 et seq. (1932), as amended, WASH. LAWS 1943, c. 98 (recodified as
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 63.08 et seq.; repealed 1967). The statutes of other states,
by including sales of only equipment, brought service enterprises within the ambit
of the bulk sales law. E.g., N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 44(1) (repealed 1964). Where the
Bulk Sales Act did not expressly include a specified service enterprise, the tendency
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men intended to exclude service enterprises from the requirements of
Article 6,62 five states have similarly amended their bulk transfer pro-
visions to include restaurants and other specified service enterprises.63
Finally, a limited number of manufacturers are covered by Article
6.64 The words "including those who manufacture what they sell" in
subsection 6-102(3) could be interpreted to encompass all manufac-
of the courts was to hold that the bulk sales law did not apply to businesses that
sold services rather than merchandise. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Smith, 188 Va. 214,
49 S.E.2d 310 (1948).
62. All Nite Garage, Inc. v. A.A.A. Towing, Inc., 85 Nev. 193, 452 P.2d 902
(1969) (sale of towing service enterprise not within Article 6); Silco Automatic
Vending Co. v. Howells, 102 N.J. Super. 243, 245 A.2d 765 (1968), aff'd, 105 N.J.
Super. 111, 253 A.2d 480 (1969) (sale of tavern business not within Article 6,
unless principal business of tavern is sale of packaged beverages for off-premises
consumption) ; Kane-Miller Corp. v. Tip Tree Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 776, 303 N.Y.S.2d
273 (1969) (hotel-restaurant-bar business principally engaged in sale of services
rather than sale of merchandise from stock). Several lower court Pennsylvania
decisions have held, contrary to the language of section 6-102, the Official Comment,
that the sale of a restaurant business is subject to the Bulk Transfers Article. Zinni v.
One Township Line Corp., 36 Pa. D.&C.2d 297 (Del. Co. 1965) ; Uhr v. 3361, Inc., 21
Pa. D.&C.2d 348 (Phila. Co. 1960); Brooks v. Lambert, 10 Pa. D.&C.2d 237 (Del. Co.
1957). But, two years after Zinni, a Pennsylvania county court, examining the merits
of these cases and reaching a contrary conclusion, stated: "A close reading of [these]
cases . . . discloses no reasoning assigned for their holding, and they appear to be
following precedent based upon interpretations of the Pennsylvania Bulk Sales Act of
1919." Chas. Adler & Son, Inc. v. DiNuncio, 11 Lebanon Co. Leg. J. 464, 465 (Pa.
Com. Pleas 1967). For a criticism of the earlier Pennsylvania decisions, see DUESEN-
BERG & KING, supra note 11, § 15.02[2]. The inclusion of restaurants within the scope of
Article 6 by the Pennsylvania courts has also been criticized by the courts of other
states. See, e.g., Silco Automatic Vending Co. v. Howells, 102 N.J. Super. 243, 245
A.2d 765 (1968), aff'd, 105 N.J. Super. 111, 253 A.2d 480 (1969) ; Nichols v. Acers
Co., 415 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
63. California's version of subsection 6-102(3) subjects the following types of
enterprises to the provisions of Article 6: "that of a baker, cafe or restaurant
owner, garage owner, cleaner and dyer, or retail or wholesale merchant." CAL. COMM.
CODE § 6102(3) (West 1964). The Idaho section includes "hotel, restaurant, barber
shop or beauty salon business, whether or not said business is the sale of merchandise
from stock." 28 IDAHO CODE § 28-6-102(3) (1967). In 1970, New York amended
section 6-102(1) to read: "'Bulk Transfer' shall also include a transfer out of the
ordinary course of business of a major part of the goods, wares and merchandise
of a restaurant and other food dispensing establishment." N.Y.U.C.C. § 6-102(1)
(McKinney 1974). Oregon amended subsection 6-102(3) in a similar fashion by
adding the phrase "restaurants or other food dispensing establishments," ORE. REV.
STAT. § 76.1020(3) (1963). Finally, the Washington Code provides: "[t]he
enterprises subject to this Article are all those of a vendor engaged in the business
of buying and selling and dealing in goods, wares or merchandise, of any kind or
description, or in the business of operating a restaurant, cafe, beer parlor, tavern,
hotel, club or gasoline service station." WASH. Rzv. CODE ANN. § 62A.6-102(3)
(1967).
64. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-102(3).
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turers because every manufacturer must sell its products.65 However,
the quoted words modify the scope of "all those whose principal busi-
ness is the sale of merchandise from stock." Therefore, the words
"including those who manufacture what they sell" should mean that
only those manufacturers, such as a bakery, who are principally en-
gaged in the sale of merchandise from stock are subject to Article 6.6
The Code, thereby, broadens the description of businesses that were
covered under the various Bulk Sales Acts which had generally ex-
cluded manufacturers.6 7
Not in the Ordinary Course of Business
The verbiage found in the Code, "any transfer in bulk and not
in the ordinary course of the transferor's business,"6" closely parallels
the terminology of many Bulk Sales Acts which designated a transfer
as being in bulk if made "otherwise than in the ordinary course of
trade and in the regular and usual prosecution of the seller's business." 69
Unfortunately, neither the Code nor the Bulk Sales Acts defines
"ordinary course of business. ' 70
The cases under the various Bulk Sales Acts were often con-
tradictory. For example, a New York court held a single sale of
1,300 pairs of shoes to be in the ordinary course of business 71 while a
Mississippi court determined that a business, preparing to change its
location, that sold a portion of its stock of dresses was subject to the
state's Bulk Sales Act.72 One federal court, faced with the question
twice in the same year, demonstrated the difficulty of interpreting
65. See Hogan, The Highways and Some of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk
Sales Articles of the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 36 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Hogan].
66. See HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at 839; Shanker, Bulk Transfers under
Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 COM. L.J. 249, 250 (1962).
67. See, e.g., Frederick v. Dettary Eng'r Co., 318 Mich. 252, 28 N.W.2d 94
(1947). Occasionally, wholesalers were also found to be beyond the scope of a
Bulk Sales Act. See, e.g., Connecticut Steam Brownstone Co. v. Lewis, 86 Conn. 386,
85 A. 534 (1912).
68. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-102(1) (emphasis added).
69. For a comprehensive discussion of the phrase "out of the ordinary course
of trade" as used in the pre-Code laws, see Miller, Bulk Sales Laws: Meaning to be
Attached to the Quantitative and Qualitative Requirements Phrases of the Statutes,
1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 283, 298-312 [hereinafter cited as Miller].
70. See Weintraub & Levin in COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 9,
§ 22.06[4]. The phrase "buyer in ordinary course of business" is defined by UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(9), but this definition is not applicable to bulk transfers
because the definition provides that the term "buying" does not include a transfer
in bulk.
71. Sternberg v. Rubinstein, 305 N.Y. 235, 112 N.E.2d 210 (1953), noted in
18 ALBANY L. REV. 43 (1954) and 23 FORDHAM L. REV. 93 (1954).
72. Cohen v. Calhoun, 168 Miss. 34, 150 So. 198 (1933).
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"ordinary course of business." Applying the Alabama statute, the
court held the sale by an automobile dealer of approximately fifty
percent of his automobiles, together with a substantial inventory of
repair parts, to be in the ordinary course of business.73 The court
appeared to rely upon the common practice among automobile dealers
of trading between themselves.74 Thereafter, the same court applied
the Georgia Act to a sale by a dealer involving twenty-three automno-
biles out of a total stock of between twenty-five and thirty cars.7" This
sale was held to be outside the ordinary course of business seemingly
because it involved substantially all of the seller's stock.7"
There is every reason to expect that, under Article 6, courts will
continue to face difficulty in deciding whether a particular transfer has
been made in the "ordinary course of the transferor's business." The
pre-Code cases, however, do suggest one crucial factor: whether the
transferee is within the class of customers with whom the transferor
usually deals on a volume basis. 7 7 Thus, in Pastimes Publishing Co.
v. Advertising Displays,78 the court properly held the sale of an entire
inventory of books by one publisher to another to be outside "the
ordinary course of the transferor's business" and ineffective for non-
compliance with Article 6.79
Exceptions
The Code, in section 6-103, excepts eight types of bulk transfers
from its coverage, thereby eliminating the requirement of compliance
with Article 6.80 Subsections 6-103(1) through (5) and subsection
73. Roberts v. Norrell, 212 F. Supp. 897, 903 (N.D. Ala. 1963).
74. Id.
75. Chattanooga Discount Corp. v. West, 219 F. Supp. 140 (N.D. Ala. 1963).
76. Id. at 145.
77. See Note, Transactions Within the Bulk Transfer Acts and Creditors Pro-
tected Thereby, 43 IOWA L. REV. 572, 576 (1958). See also Miller, supra note 69, at
302. Professor Miller suggests additional factors to be considered: state of mind
of the seller, solvency of the seller, and the seller's ability to continue in business
after the transfer.
78. 6 Ill. App. 3d 414, 286 N.E.2d 19 (1972).
79. Id. at 416, 286 N.E.2d at 21.
80. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-103 reads:
The following transfers are not subject to this Article:
(1) Those made to give security for the performance of an obligation;
(2) General assignments for the benefit of all the creditors of the transferor,
and subsequent transfers by the assignee thereunder;
(3) Transfers in settlement or realization of a lien or other security
interest;
(4) Sales by executors, administrators, receivers, trustees in bankruptcy, or
any public officer under judicial process;
(5) Sales made in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings for
the dissolution or reorganization of a corporation and of which notice is sent
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6-103 (8), codify, without material change, the pre-Code law of most
states .' But, subsections 6-103(6) and (7) represent major and
desirable changes in the law of bulk transfers.
Subsection 6-103(6) offers an alternative to compliance with
the formalities of Article 6 where there is a need for an expeditious
transfer. To come within this exception, a bulk transfer must comply
with four stated conditions: (1) the transferee maintains a known
place of business in the state, (2) the transferee becomes bound to
pay the debts of the transferor in full, (3) the transferee gives public
notice of that fact, 2 and (4) the transferee is solvent after becoming
to the creditors of the corporation pursuant to order of the court or administrative
agency;
(6) Transfers to a person maintaining a known place of business in this
State who becomes bound to pay the debts of the transferor in full and gives public
notice of that fact, and who is solvent after becoming so bound;
(7) A transfer to a new business enterprise organized to take over and
continue the business, if public notice of the transaction is given and the new
enterprise assumes the debts of the transferor and he receives nothing from
the transaction except an interest in the new enterprise junior to the claims
of creditors ;
(8) Transfers of property which is exempt from execution.
Public notice under subsection (6) or subsection (7) may be given by
publishing once a week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation where the transferor had its principal place of business in this state an
advertisement including the names and addresses of the transferor and transferee and
the effective date of the transfer.
81. See HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at 843. Under the various bulk sales statutes,
the law was not uniform in deciding whether "bulk mortgages" should be subject
to the bulk sales provisions. In the absence of a bulk mortgage act, courts usually
exclude mortgages from the bulk sales law by reasoning that, when a mortgage is
executed, the transferor's interest in the mortgaged property is not terminated and
further that the purpose of the mortgage is to continue, rather than end, the operation
of the business. E.g., Farrow v. Farrow, 136 Ark. 140, 206 S.W. 134 (1918);
Appel Mercantile Co. v. Kirtland, 105 Neb. 494, 181 N.W. 151 (1920). Some courts,
however, held to the contrary. E.g., Citizens State Bank v. Rogers, 155 Kan. 478,
126 P.2d 214 (1942). UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-103(1) expressly excludes
any transfer "made to give security for the performance of an obligation" because
security interests in all kinds of personal property are regulated by Article 9 of the
Code. California, in adopting Article 6, departed from the proposed text by providing
that the grant of a security interest in bulk, except purchase money security interests
both in inventory of durable goods having a unit value of at least $500 and in
inventory of a wholesale merchant, constitute a "transfer" governed by the bulk
transfer law of California. CAL. COMM. CODE §§ 6102, 6103(1) (West 1964).
82. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-103 requires that such notice must be
published once a week for two consecutive weeks "in a newspaper of general circulation
where the transferor had its principal place of business." The advertisement must
include the names and address of the transferor and transferee and the effective
date of the transfer. If there is no qualifying newspaper where the transferor
has his place of business, then the newspaper to be used is determined by provisions
contained in Article 1 as well as any other applicable state statute. Prior to 1962,
the Code did not define what was meant by public notice. This omission was noted
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so bound."3 Obviously, if these four conditions are met, the transferor's
creditors are not and can not be injured by noncompliance with the
requirements of Article 6. The creditors should not complain; they
have a direct action against a known solvent party as well as their
original claim against the transferor whose debts are not discharged
by his transfer in bulk. 4 There is, therefore, no justifiable reason to
subject the bulk transfer to the "delay and red tape" imposed by
Article 6.85
Despite the draftsmen's attempt to achieve clarity by stating
four specific requirements for compliance with subsection 6-103(6),
two ambiguities persist. The failure of Article 6 to delineate those
debts that the transferee must assume or to state how long the trans-
feree must remain solvent following the transfer may produce litigation
over the applicability of this exception to a particular bulk transfer.8 6
Neither of these questions has yet been judicially answered.
Subsection 6-103(7) is concerned with bulk transfers that are
made in connection with formal changes in the business organization
of an enterprise. Such a change might occur, for example, either by
incorporation of a business previously conducted as a sole proprietor-
ship or partnership or by change in the composition of a partnership. 7
Under the various pre-Code laws, there was a diversity of judicial
opinion as to whether such bulk transfers had to comply with the
Bulk Sales Acts. A majority of courts held that a transfer of a partner-
ship interest to an existing partner was not within the bulk sales law
because such a transfer did not involve a direct exchange of any
tangible assets but merely the reapportionment of an intangible right
to share in the proceeds of the firm after payment of the partnership
in the New York study of the Code. See Leg. Doe. No. 65(G) at 1743-44. The
Permanent Editorial Board then recommended adoption of a provision for public
notice. Report No. 1, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE 'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 29 (1962). A 1962 amendment to section 6-103, which now constitutes the
last full sentence of this section, cured the omission. For a criticism of the earlier
omission see Steingold, Bulk Sales and the Uniform Commercial Code, 59 CoM. L.J.
92, 96 (1954). Although section 6-103 does not state when the public notice should
be given, it is submitted that such notice should be made upon the occurrence of
the transfer. One commentator has suggested that the publication of such notice
"should take place a reasonable time after the transfer." Weintraub & Levin in
COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 9, § 22.08[4]. No Code decisions have been
found in which the validity of the public notice was challenged.
83. See HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at 843.
84. See id. Forgey, Bulk Transfers, 29 Mo. L. REV. 449, 453 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Forgey].
85. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-103, Comment 4.
86. See DUESENBERG & KING, supra note 11, § 15.03[5].
87. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-103, Comment 5.
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debts."8 However, many courts distinguished the case of a sale by a
partner to an outsider, who thereby became a partner in the existing
firm. This latter transfer was generally considered within the purview
of the bulk sales laws. 9 Additionally, the process of incorporation
was usually held to be a transfer subject to bulk sales laws, 9° even
though creditors could proceed against the corporate stock owned by
the transferor.9 '
The Code declares that bulk transfers made in connection with
formal changes in business organizations must comply with Article 6.
992
Subsection 6-103(7), however, provides a mechanism for excepting
such bulk transfers if: (1) the new enterprise is organized to take
over and continue the business, (2) public notice of the transaction
is given,9 3 (3) the new enterprise assumes the debts of the trans-
feror,9 ' and (4) the transferee receives nothing from the transaction
except an interest, junior to the claims of creditors, in the new enter-
prise. Here again, if these four conditions are met, the exception
from Article 6 is justified because the transferor's creditors neither
are, nor can be injured, by noncompliance with the requirements of
Article 6.95
The eight exceptions provided in section 6-103 are exclusive;
any bulk transfer not within one of these exceptions must comply with
88. Fairfield Shoe Co. v. Olds, 176 Ind. 526, 96 N.E. 592 (1911). Contra,
Minder v. Gurley, 37 Wash. 2d 123, 222 P.2d 185 (1950).
89. E.g., Sampson v. Boysen, 9 Cal. App. 2d 413, 50 P.2d 95 (1935) ; Daly v.
Sumpter Drug Co., 127 Tenn. 412, 155 S.W. 167 (1913); Marlow v. Ringer, 79
W. Va. 586, 91 S.E. 386 (1917). Contra, Yancy v. Lamar-Rankin Drug Co., 140
Ga. 359, 78 S.E. 1078 (1913). See generally Note, Bulk Sales Act - What Is a
"Sale in Bulkf," 82 U. PA. L. REv. 856 (1934).
90. E.g., Smith-Calhoun Rubber Co. v. McGhee Rubber Co., 235 S.W. 321
(Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
91. Some jurisdictions held that incorporation did not amount to a bulk transfer
because the creditors could reach the processes of the corporate stock. Maskell v.
Spokane Cycle & Auto Supply Co., 100 Wash. 16, 170 P. 350 (1918); McLean v.
Miller Robinson Co., 55 F.2d 232 (E.D. Pa. 1931).
92. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-102(1).
93. See note 82 supra.
94. Here again, the failure of Article 6 to define "debts" may present the
same problem discussed in the text accompanying note 86 supra. No Code decisions
have been found in which this particular exclusion has been challenged.
95. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-103, Comment 5. The Louisiana Bulk Sales
Act expressly recognized this exception. LA. REv. STAT. § 9-2965 (1950). When the
Bulk Sales Act was silent, the pre-Code decisions were in conflict as to whether
the statute applied to a transfer to a new business entity. Compare Maskell v.
Spokane Cycle & Auto Supply Co., 100 Wash. 16, 170 P. 350 (1918) (transfer not
covered by Act), with Sakelos & Co. v. Hutchinson Bros., 129 Md. 300, 99 A. 357
(1916) (transfer covered by Act). See generally Billig & Smith, Bulk Sales Laws:
Transactions Covered by These Statutes, 39 W. VA. L.Q. 323 (1933).
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Article 6. Further, when a bulk transfer is challenged for noncompli-
ance with Article 6, although the Code is silent, two courts have held
that the burden is on the defendant (transferor, transferee or both)
to plead as an affirmative defense that compliance is not necessary
because the bulk transfer falls within a specified exception."
COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 6
The Code prescribes, in detail, the duties of the transferor and
transferee in a bulk transfer. 7  Primarily, Article 6 requires, for the
bulk transfer to be effective, that the transferee give notice of the im-
pending transfer to the creditors of the transferor.9 ' To further effec-
tuate the purpose of Article 6, prevention of commercial fraud, sub-
section 6-104(1) stipulates that a bulk transfer"9 will not be effective
against any of the transferor's creditors unless:
(a) The transferee requires the transferor to furnish a list
of his existing creditors . . . ; and
(b) The parties prepare a schedule of the property trans-
ferred sufficient to identify it; and
(c) The transferee preserves the list and schedule for six
months next following the transfer and permits inspection of either
or both and copying therefrom at all reasonable hours by any
creditor of the transferor, or files the list and schedule in [a desig-
nated public office] l 100
96. Sado v. Sado, N.Y. LAW J., May 16, 1967, at 19, 4 U.C.C. REPORTING SERV.
213 (Kings Co. N.Y. 1967); Uhr v. 3361, Inc., 21 Pa. D.&C.2d 348 (Phila. Co. 1960).
97. The Bulk Transfers Article will be applied to a transfer according to the
law of the state where the goods are located irrespective of the residence or principal
place of business of the transferor or the transferee. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 6-102(4). The parties can not change this conflict of laws rule. UNIFORM COM-
MERciAL CODE § 1-105(2). The rationale for this restriction has been explained as
follows: "[A]lthough as between themselves the parties to an agreement for sale
of property may lawfully agree as to governing law, nevertheless where the rights
of third party creditors are involved the law of the situs of the property is
controlling." Weintraub & Levin in COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 9,
§ 22.05[1] [a].
98. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-105.
99. Auction sales, which are dealt with in section 6-108, are excepted from the
provisions of section 6-104. See notes 176-192 infra and accompanying text.
100. The designated office in Maryland is "the office of the clerk of the circuit
court in the county, or of Superior Court of Baltimore City, in which the property
was located at the time of transfer." MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 6-104(1) (c)
(1964 Repl. Vol.).
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The List of Creditors and the Schedule of Property
Although Article 6 does not expressly state when the list of
creditors'0 ' must be prepared, section 6-105, pertaining to notice, 11 2
indicates that this list should be compiled at least ten days before the
transferee either takes possession of or pays for the goods.03 The list
of creditors
must be signed and sworn to or affirmed by the transferor or his
agent. It must contain the names and business addresses of all
creditors of the transferor, with the amounts when known, and
also the names of all persons who are known to the transferor to
assert claims against him even though such claims are disputed.'
Subsection 1-201(12) delineates the general scope of the word
"creditor" 
:
"Creditor" includes a general creditor, a secured creditor, a lien
creditor and any representative of creditors, including an assignee
for the benefit of creditors, a trustee in bankruptcy, a receiver in
equity and an executor or administrator of an insolvent debtor's
or assignor's estate.
This delineation is restricted by subsection 6-109(1) to those credi-
tors "holding claims based on transactions or events occurring before
the bulk transfer . "105 Thus, the creditors who must be enu-
101. See F. HART & W. WILLIER, FORMS AND PROCEDURES UNDER THE U.C.C.
§ 67.04 (1974) [hereinafter cited as HART & WILLIER] for a form for the list of
creditors.
102. See notes 127-159 infra and accompanying text.
103. See Hogan, supra note 65, at 38.
104. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-104(2). This subsection further provides
that a transferor who is an obligor of an outstanding issue of bonds, debentures
or the like as to which there is an indenture trustee may, upon his election, include
only the name and address of the indenture trustee and the aggregate outstanding
principal amount of the issue. This special provision was added by a 1963 amendment
and has been adopted by all states, except Arkansas, Oklahoma, Oregon and Rhode
Island. ANDERSON, supra note 31, § 6-104:3, at 455-60.
Further, although subsection 6-104(2) requires only the names of creditors
whose claims are disputed by the transferor, one commentator has suggested that
the addresses of such creditors be listed together with the transferor's statement
whether the entire claim or only part thereof is in dispute. Id. § 6-104:6, at 461.
105. But, creditors who extend credit after notice of the bulk transfer but
before the completion of the bulk transfer are protected if the governing state
has enacted section 6-106, requiring the proceeds of the sale to be applied to all
creditors. See notes 160-175 infra and accompanying text. Similarly, subsection
6-109(2) is an optional provision that permits the transferee or auctioneer to
receive credit for sums paid to particular creditors of the transferor, not exceeding
the sums believed in good faith at the time of payment to be properly payable to
such creditors.
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merated in the list of creditors include literally all creditors, whether
merchandise creditors, personal creditors or otherwise, who have liqui-
dated or unliquidated claims against the transferor, whether secured
or unsecured, fixed or contingent, matured or unmatured.' ° This
broad definition of creditor has been criticized by several commenta-
tors, and at least one leading writer has urged that Article 6 be
amended to limit "creditors" to "business creditors only."' 7
The requirement of subsection 6-104(2) that the transferor
swear to the accuracy of the list of creditors invokes the criminal sanc-
tions for false swearing.'08 The same criminal sanctions existed under
a number of Bulk Sales Acts which declared a falsely sworn statement,
knowingly made in connection with the preparation of a list of creditors,
to constitute perjury. 0 9
The Code substantially adopts the earlier law as to the legal effect
of an incomplete or inaccurate list of creditors upon the validity of a
bulk transfer. Under the Bulk Sales Acts, the courts generally held
106. See Ross Industrial Chemical Co. v. Smith, 5 Mich. App. 422, 146 N.W.2d 816
(1966) (disputed creditors must be included in list). Some commentators have
asserted that the term "creditor" is absolutely unlimited. Weintraub & Levin in
COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 11, § 22.13[2]; Barkin & Gilbert, Bulk Transfers
in Florida - The Creditor Protected, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 158, 161-62 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Barkin & Gilbert].
The list of creditors must also include any federal, state or local govern-
ment claims for taxes. One writer has suggested that taxing agencies are the
creditors most frequently omitted from the list. Note, Bulk Transfers - An Analysis
of the Changes in New York Law, 11 N.Y.L.F. 112, 119 (1965). On this subject,
Professor Lamey further states:
Now in view of the many, many various types of tax today imposed upon business,
it would seem to follow that every buyer should appreciate the possibility that
one government or the other - federal, state or even local - is possibly a
creditor, at least a contingent creditor, of the seller; and consequently, if the
sworn list of creditors does not refer to this tax problem, it seems to me that
a well-advised buyer would nonetheless see to it that the appropriate taxing
authorities were notified of the prospective transfer, because in [United States
v. Goldblatt, 128 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1942)] the Circuit Court of Appeals held
that today each businessman is in fact put on constructive notice of the possibility
of such tax delinquency and consequently may well find himself charged with a
failure to comply with the notice requirement in the statute.
Lamey, supra note 12, at 71.
107. Rapson, Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Problems and Pitfalls
in Conducting Bulk Sales, 68 Com. L.J. 226, 227 n.14 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Rapson]. See also Miller, The Effect of the Bulk Sales Article on Existing Com-
mercial Practices, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 267, 280 (1951) ; Raff, supra note 31,
at 112.
108. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-104, Comment 3.
109. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 46 (citing nineteen states including
criminal penalties in their bulk sales statutes for a seller who knowingly and willfully
makes a false statement).
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where the transferor accidentally or intentionally failed to list any of
his creditors, the sale could not be set aside as fraudulent if the trans-
feree acted in good faith and complied with the Act by notifying all
creditors included in the list provided by the transferor.11 ° One
court explained this rule as follows: "[I]f the vendor furnishes a false
list, he goes to prison, but the vendee, acting in good faith, and
with reasonable diligence is not to be mulcted because he has been
deceived."'' Subsection 6-104(3), in following this pre-Code law,
provides: "Responsibility for the completeness and accuracy of the
list of creditors rests on the transferor, and the transfer is not ren-
dered ineffective by errors or omissions therein unless the transferee
is shown to have had knowledge."
What constitutes the transferee's "knowledge" that the list of
creditors contains "errors or omissions"? The general definition sec-
tion of the Code provides that "a person 'knows' or has 'knowledge'
of a fact when he has actual knowledge of it.""' 2 This narrow defini-
tion of "knowledge" would seem to indicate that subsection 6-104(3)
does not impose upon the transferee a duty to inquire as to the accuracy
of the list of creditors. In Adrian Tabin Corp. v. Climax Boutique,
Inc.,"' a New York appellate court, in a 3-2 decision, agreed with this
assumption. A creditor of the transferor alleged that the bulk sale was
ineffective because the transferee, who had received an affidavit of "no
creditors" from the transferor and had no actual knowledge of the
creditors, failed to inquire as to the possible existence of any creditors.
The trial court, noting "that the purchasers had not requested an exami-
nation of the seller's books and had not questioned the source of the
garments involved in the sale," held that, by failing to make a careful
inquiry of the seller as to existing creditors, the purchasers had acted
at their own peril." 4 The lower court, therefore, set aside the sale.
The appellate court reversed, finding that the New York pre-Code
decisions, imposing a duty to inquire upon the purchaser, were not
applicable under Article 6.115 The court based its decision on the lan-
110. See generally, Annot., 83 A.L.R. 1140 (1933).
Ill. Coach v. Gage, 70 Ore. 183, 189, 138 P. 847, 849 (1914).
112. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(25).
113. 40 App. Div. 2d 146, 338 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1972), noted in 52 N.C.L. R~v. 165
(1973).
114. Id. at 148, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
115. Id. The dissent, relying in part upon the prior New York case law, argued:
[A] purchaser or transferee of the entire stock of a going business knows the
seller more than likely has some creditors. He should at least inquire into the
sources of the inventory. Otherwise, the opportunity for fraud upon creditors
is too great.
Id. at 150, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
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guage of subsection 6-104(3), expressly providing that a transfer is
not rendered ineffective by errors or omissions in the list of creditors
unless the transferee is shown to have had knowledge. The court stated:
As the purchasers concededly had no actual knowledge of the
plaintiff, the possibility of whose existence as a creditor was denied
by the seller in an affidavit (the purchasers having no reason to
disbelieve the truthfulness of the affidavit), the bulk sale may not
be set aside as to the plaintiff." 6
Nevertheless, the prudent attorney would be well advised to file a
"request for information '"" 7 with the Secretary of State and with the
appropriate county office to verify that all persons claiming security
interests in the transferor's property have been included in the list of
creditors.
With respect to the schedule of property" 8 involved in a bulk
transfer, subsection 6-104(1) (b) requires that "[t]he parties pre-
pare a schedule of the property transferred sufficient to identify it.""'
This rule represents an improvement over some Bulk Sales Acts which
required the seller to make a detailed inventory showing the cost of
each article included in the sale.'12 This burdensome task, compelling
the seller to disclose the cost price of each article to the buyer, is
abolished by the Code. No longer will "every paper of pins or fine
tooth comb ...have to be inventoried ....
Compliance with the Code formalities for the schedule of property
transferred is not difficult. The responsibility for the accuracy and
completeness of the schedule of property, unlike the list of creditors,
116. Id. at 148, 338 N.Y.S2d at 62; accord, Silco Automatic Vending Co. v.
Howells, 102 N.J. Super. 243, 245 A2d 765 (1968) (dicta), aff'd, 105 N.J. Super. 511,
253 A.2d 480 (1969); see In re Peters, 266 F. Supp. 742 (D. Utah 1967) (when
purchaser complies with Utah statute and demands prescribed affidavit, sale not
necessarily fraudulent even though unknown to purchaser, affidavit fails to list
every creditor).
117. Request for information or copies - Form U.C.C.-11.
118. See HART & WILLIER, supra note 101, at 6-143 for a form 6-6 for the
schedule of property.
119. Although not required to be a "serial number" list, the schedule should
contain more than a general description of the transferred property. A description
that reasonably identifies or makes identification possible should be sufficient. See
DUESENBERG & KING, supra note 11, § 15.04[2]. Article 6 does not require that
the schedule of property be sworn to or signed.
120. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 442.1 (1948) (repealed 1964) ("[The
seller .. . and purchaser . . . shall . . .make a full detailed inventory, showing
the quantity and, so far as possible with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the
cost price to the seller .. .of each article to be included in the sale.").
121. Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 330, 336, 75 N.E. 404, 407 (1905).
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lies with both the transferor and the transferee. 122 In practice, the
transferee is not prejudiced by this sharing of responsibility. If the
transferee is aware of what he is purchasing, he may easily compare
this with the schedule of property and, thereby, verify the correctness
of the schedule. Additionally, the schedule of property must be pre-
pared in time to be available for examination by the creditors entitled
to notice of the transfer - a minimum of ten days before the transfer.
1 23
This schedule does not have to be sent to each creditor; the Code
permits the transferee to send a "general description of the property
to be transferred"'2 4 to each creditor rather than a detailed listing.
Once the list of creditors has been furnished to the transferee and
the necessary schedule of property has been prepared by the parties,
the Code requires that the transferee must either: (1) preserve the
list and schedule for six months following the transfer and permit
inspection and copying therefrom at all reasonable hours by any credi-
tor of the transferor or (2) file the list and schedule in a designated
public office.' 25 Although the six month preservation requirement is
phrased in terms of the transfer date, the Code does not define this
date. A reasonable interpretation would be that the transfer occurs
on the date that title to the property is conveyed to the transferee. 26
Notice to Creditors
The heart of Article 6 is the requirement that the transferee give
due notice of the bulk transfer, except one made at an auction sale,
12
1
in the manner and to the persons specified in section 6-107 at least
ten days before he pays for or takes possession of the goods, which-
ever occurs first. 2 ' Section 6-107 stipulates that in specified cases
122. See ANDERSON, supra note 31, § 6-104:5, at 460; Lamey, supra note 12,
at 71. The transferee is primarily responsible for the accuracy of the schedule of
property. If the schedule of property contains inaccuracies or omits property in
fact transferred, the transferee cannot assert lack of knowledge as a defense. No
Code decisions have been found in which a bulk transfer was challenged on the
ground that a schedule of property was legally defective.
123. See Hogan, supra note 65, at 38.
124. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-197 (2) (a).
125. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-104(1) (c). Arkansas, California and
Colorado have eliminated the option of filing in a designated public office. See 2
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 464-66 (1968). Colorado requires that the list and
schedule be filed with the Secretary of State if the address where the documents
are to be preserved is not within the state. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-6--104(1) (c)
(1963).
126. See HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at 849.
127. See notes 176-192 infra and accompanying text.
128. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-105, Comment 1. By comparison, the
amount of notice required under the various bulk sales statutes ranged from as
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either a short or long form of statutory notice of the bulk transfer shall
be given by the transferee "to all the persons shown on the list of
creditors furnished by the transferor . . . and to all other persons who
are known to the transferee to hold or assert claims against the trans-
feror."' 29 Failure to comply with this notice provision renders the
bulk transfer "ineffective against any creditor of the transferor,"' 3
thereby, subjecting the goods in the possession of the transferee to
the claims of the unpaid creditors of the transferor.'
The transferee shall provide the statutory notice in accordance
with the short form only when "all debts of the transferor are to be paid
in full as they fall due as a result of the transaction."'3 2 The short-
form notice must state: (1) that the bulk transfer is about to be
made, 3 3 (2) the names and business addresses of the parties involved
and all other business names and addresses known by the transferee to
have been used by the transferor within the past three years, 33 and
(3) that the debts of the transferor will be paid in full as they fall due
and the address to which creditors should send their bills for payment. 31
Although attractive because of its simplicity, the short form of
notice generally will not furnish the transferee with a practical mech-
anism for compliance with the notice requirement of the Bulk Transfers
Article. The statement in the short form that "all the debts of the
transferor are to be paid in full as they fall due as a result of the trans-
action," may, in fact, amount to a representation or warranty by the
transferee.' 36 Such representation is hazardous because the transferee
little as none (Montana, Washington) to fourteen days (Connecticut). Typically,
these statutes required five days notice. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 16.
Wyoming, the only state to vary the Code provision for ten days notice, presently
requires five days notice. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-105 (Supp. 1971).
129. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-107(3).
130. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-105.
131. In the event of noncompliance, the transferor's creditors may enforce their
claims against the property transferred as though it belonged to the transferor.
See notes 193-228 infra and accompanying text.
132. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-107(1) (c).
133. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § -107(1) (a).
134. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-107(1) (b). One commentator has criticized
this requirement, imposing upon the transferee a duty to have the notice contain
the prior business names and address of the transferor and has suggested that "[al
more practical requirement would seem to be that the transferor give such information
in conjunction with the list of creditors and schedule of property so that the
transferee could make use of it in the notice" (footnotes omitted). Forgey, supra
note 84, at 457.
135. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-107(1) (c). The California version of
section 6-107 omits this requirement for the short form, CAL. COMM. CODE § 6107
(West Supp. 1975). See HART & WILLIER, supra note 101, at 6-265 for a short form
for notice to creditors.
136. See HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at 852; Rapson, supra note 107, at 228.
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has no effective means of insuring that the transferor will apply the
proceeds to the payment of his creditors. Indeed, if the transferee is
willing to guarantee this payment, he could, by expressly assuming
the debts, qualify the bulk transfer under the exception granted by
subsection 6-103 (6) and, thereby, avoid the "red tape" of Article 6."'
Caution, therefore, dictates that the transferee use the long form
rather than the short form of statutory notice. Subsection 6-107(2)
requires that the notice to creditors be in long form "[i]f the debts
of the transferor are not to be paid in full as they fall due or if the
transferee is in doubt on that point ... ."138 In addition to the state-
ments contained in the short form, the long form of notice must in-
clude the following statements: (1) the location and general description
of the property being transferred,1 39 (2) the estimated total, obtainable
from the list of creditors, of the transferor's debts,14 ° (3) the address
where the schedule of property and list of creditors is available for
inspection,' 4 ' (4) whether the transfer is for the purpose of paying
existing debts and, if so, the amount of such debts and to whom
owed, "'4 2 (5) whether the transfer involves new consideration and, if
so, the amount of such consideration together with the time and place
for payment thereof.1 4  Furthermore, if the transfer is for new con-
sideration and the state is one of the eighteen states to have adopted
section 6-106,14 imposing a duty upon the transferee to assure that
the transferor's creditors are paid, the long form of notice must also
state "the time and place where the transferor's creditors are to file
their claims" against the proceeds of the transfer.1 45
Having prepared the notice, whether in short or long form, the
transferee must then either deliver the notice personally or have it sent
by registered or certified mail to "all the persons shown on the list
of creditors furnished by the transferor . . . and to all other persons
who are known to the transferee to hold or assert claims against the
transferor."' 46 The transferee should also give notice of the proposed
137. Rapson, supra note 107, at 228.
138. See HART & WILLIER, supra note 101, at 6-261 for a long form for notice
to creditors.
139. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-107(2) (a).
140. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-107(2) (a).
141. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-107(2) (b).
142. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § -107(2) (c).
143. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-107(2) (d).
144. See notes 160-175 infra and accompanying text.
145. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-107(2) (e).
146. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-107(3). For slight variations in Connecticut,
Florida, New York, Washington and Wisconsin, see 2 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED
478 (1968).
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bulk transfer to the local office of the Internal Revenue Service and
the appropriate state and county tax offices. Notification of the taxing
authorities is necessary because, even if there are no past due taxes,
liability for taxes continually accrues in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. 147 The importance of giving notice to all creditors of the trans-
feror, including taxing authorities, is underscored by the language of
section 6-105 which provides that the bulk transfer "is ineffective
against any creditor of the transferor" when such notice is not given. 4'
The notice provisions of Article 6 impose one further obligation
upon the transferee: he must give notice of the proposed bulk transfer
"at least ten days before he takes possession of the goods or pays for
them, whichever happens first . . .. "' In Starman v. John Wolfe,
Inc.,5 ° the transferee, attempting to comply with this ten day notice
requirement, mailed the notice to creditors on May 19, informing
them that a bulk transfer would take place on May 29 at an address
in Missouri. The closing, however, was held in Illinois on, according
to the transferee, June 4. A creditor, having unsuccessfully gone to
the Missouri address on May 29, challenged the bulk transfer for
failure to comply with the notice requirements of Article 6. The court
held the transfer "ineffective"'' and stated:
In order to satisfy [section 6-105] the transferee should give
notice to creditors so that they receive the notice at least ten days
prior to taking possession of the goods or prior to paying for
them. The fact that a closing takes place at a time later than ten
days and at some different place than that specified in the notice
is not a compliance with [section 6-105].1152
The case may be criticized with respect to the court's holding that
the creditor must "receive" at least ten days notice since the Code
requirement is that the transferee "gives notice." The Code elsewhere
defines "gives" as "taking such steps as may be reasonably required
to inform the other in ordinary course whether or not such other
actually comes to know of it."' 58 But, the court correctly held the
notice defective for specifying the wrong address where the transfer
147. See Hansell, Bulk Transfer under Article 6 of the Iowa Uniform Com-
mnercial Code, 19 DRAKE L. REv. 275, 285 (1970) ; Lamey, supra note 12, at 71.
148. There have been no reported Code decisions declaring a bulk transfer
ineffective for failure to give notice to all creditors.
149. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-105.
150. 490 S.W.2d 377 (Mo. App. 1973).
151. Id. at 385.
152. Id. at 384-85 (emphasis added).
153. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(26).
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was to take place. In so holding, the court was undoubtedly influenced
by the creditor's attempt to be present at the transfer.
Several commentators have criticized the minimum ten day notice
requirement as being inadequate to protect the creditors.'54 One com-
mentary asserts that, considering normal mail delivery and interven-
ing weekends, the effective notice period may be as little as five days. 5
Moreover, others have questioned the wisdom of the language
"at least ten days before he takes possession of the goods or pays for
them, whichever happens first" by arguing that the payment of any
amount, including a small down payment, must be preceded by notice
to creditors.' 56 This interpretation may place the transferee in the
awkward position of having to give notice before completion of the
negotiations for the transfer. A better reading of this notice language
would be that the necessary notice be given prior to the final payment,
completing the transaction. Two commentators, after a more complete
analysis of this problem, have concluded:
[Section 6-105] would seem to mean that the payment contem-
plated is the final payment for the goods or the act of possessing
the goods, since this section appears to talk in terms of consum-
mation of the deal rather than the prior process of negotiations.
Clearer language could have been used to prevent this ambiguity.'57
Wisconsin has attempted to avoid this linguistic uncertainty by amend-
ing section 6-105 to define "payment" as "the major part of the pur-
chase price."'5 8  The Connecticut Commercial Code offers a more
precise solution. Under this latter approach, section 6-105 does not
become operative when there is a deposit of ten percent or less of the
purchase price or when the purchase price, in whole or in part, is
placed in escrow with someone other than the transferor or his agent. 9
154. Larson, Bulk Transfers: Some Interpretive Problems, 2 RUTGERS-CAMDEN
L.J. 101, 111 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Larson] ; Weintraub & Levin, supra note 7,
at 433.
155. Weintraub & Levin, supra note 7, at 433.
156. Hogan, supra note 65, at 38 ("Great care should be taken to avoid part
payment prior to compliance with the statute") ; see HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at
851; Rapson, supra note 107, at 228; Commentary, supra note 11, at 299.
157. DUESENBERG & KING, supra note 11, § 15.04[3]. The Permanent Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code apparently agrees that section 6-105
contemplates final payment. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE, REP. No. 3 at 93 (1967); PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, REP. No. 2 at 112 (1965).
158. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 406-105 (1964). Interestingly, the Permanent Editorial
Board commented that this change was not necessary "to make it clear that the
ordinary earnest money payment does not bring the section into operation." PERMA-
NENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REP. No. 2 at 112 (1965).
159. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-6-105 (Supp. 1975).
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Application of Proceeds to the Payment of Creditors
The various Bulk Sales Acts were in sharp
. 
conflict as to whether
the transferee had the personal duty to apply any new consideration
exchanged in the bulk sale to the debts of the transferor. The New
York and Pennsylvania Acts represented the two divergent approaches.
The New York Bulk Sales Act, followed in forty. other jurisdictions,16 °
did not impose such a personal duty upon the transferee.' 6 ' However,
eleven jurisdictions had provisions in their Bulk Sales Acts, patterned
after Pennsylvania's Act, requiring the purchaser to assure that the
purchase price was applied to the payment of the seller's debts.'62
The variation between the New York and Pennsylvania ap-
proaches may be explained by a differing philosophy as to the scope
of statutory protection to be afforded the seller's creditors. Those
acts patterned after New York's were designed simply to give notice
to the seller's creditors. Underlying these acts was the presumption
that the seller's creditors, once notified of the proposed bulk sale, could
adequately protect their interests. 63 In contrast, the Pennsylvania Act
and its progeny, long favored by credit men, reflect an assumption
that the creditors' interests could be effectively protected only by
imposing upon the transferee the personal duty to apply the new con-
sideration from the bulk sale to the payment of the seller's debts.164
The draftsmen of Article 6, cognizant of the divergence of au-
thority as to whether the transferee should be personally responsible
for applying any new consideration to the payment of the transferor's
debts, drafted an optional provision, section 6-106, articulating the
Pennsylvania rule. No opinion has been expressed by the draftsmen
160. Weintraub & Levin in COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS; supra note 9, § 22.04 [3] [a]
n.20; Weintraub & Levin, supra note 7, at 420 n.7 (listing thirty-eight states having
no provision for the disposition of proceeds from a bulk sale).
161. HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at 853; Commentary, supra note 11, at 286.
162. Weintraub & Levin in COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 9, § 22.04[3] [b]
n.22.
163. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-101, Comment 4:
Advance notice to the seller's creditors of the impending sale is an important
protection against [fraud], since with notice the creditors can take steps to
impound the proceeds if they think it necessary. In many states, typified for
instance by New York, such notice is substantially the only protection which
bulk sales statutes give.
Professor Lamey further notes:
The only thing that the notice gives him [the creditor], it seems to me, is an
alarm. It alerts him to what is going on. It permits him, therefore, to move in
and to watch his debtor in respect to the proceeds which will be forthcoming
from this sale.
Lamey, supra note 12, at 72.
164. Larson, supra note 154, at 111.
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as to the wisdom of imposing such a duty upon the transferee. Rather,
an explanatory note to section 6-106 states "that this is a point on
which State enactments may differ without serious damage to the
principle of uniformity." 6 5
Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have omitted
section 6-106 and all optional subsections related to that section. 6'
The two reasons generally advanced in support of this omission are the
additional burden placed upon the transferee and the personal liability
imposed upon the transferee for failure to comply with section 6-106.167
Nineteen states, including Maryland, and the Virgin Islands, have
enacted section 6-106.xos In these jurisdictions, the transferee to
a bulk transfer in which new consideration becomes payable, except
those made by sale at auction, 69 is personally obliged
to assure that such consideration is applied so far as necessary to
pay those debts of the transferor which are either shown on the
165. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-106, Note to section.
166. The subsections related to section 6-106 are UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 6-10 7(2)(e), 6-108(3)(c), and 6-109(2).
167. See, e.g., 11 N.Y.L.F. 112, 117 (1965). One leading commentator has stated
that this section
can be justified only if the buyer, now saddled with this additional duty [under
section 6-106], is enabled to perform his duty in a prompt, effective and certain
manner. This is not possible under Article 6 because of the numerous un-
answered problems. Thus, an unreasonable, oppressive, and wholly impractical
burden has been placed upon buyers of businesses in States adopting Section
6-106.
Rapson, supra note 107, at 228. Another commentary asks whether section 6-106
"has not annihilated the usefulness of the Article by imposing an intolerable burden
upon the transferee." Weintraub & Levin in COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 9,
§ 22.11[4].
168. The following states adopted section 6-106: Alaska, Florida (with varia-
tions), Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Washington and West Virginia. See Larson, supra note 154, at 109 n.44 for
statutory citations.
Some commentators have approved and endorsed the adoption of section
6-106. Professor Larson has concluded that this section
is a progressive step for the states adopting it. If bulk transfers legislation is
worth passing, it is worth the inclusion of the safeguard that any new consideration
should be distributed among the transferor's creditors. To omit section 6-106 is
to relegate the creditors to the uncertain and possibly illusory precautions of
inquiry and negotiation, followed by hasty resort to the courthouse.
Id. at 118. See also Barkin & Gilbert, supra note 106, at 166-67 (approving section
6-106). Dean Hawkland notes that "[miost writers concerned with bulk sales
legislation have endorsed section 6-106 .... ." HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at 854.
The fact, however, remains that thirty-one of the forty-nine states adopting the
Uniform Commercial Code have elected not to enact section 6-106.
169. Section 6-108(3) (c) imposes the duties of section 6-106 upon the auctioneer
in auction bulk sales.
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list furnished by the transferor ... or filed in writing in the place
stated in the notice . . . within thirty days after the mailing of
such notice. This duty of the transferee runs to all the holders of
such debts, and may be enforced by any of them for the benefit
of all.' 70
Thus, section 6-106 requires the transferee to make certain that the
purchase price is applied to all creditors, either listed or filing claims,
before any money may be paid to the transferor. If, however, any of
the debts are disputed, the transferee may retain an appropriate sum
pending resolution of the dispute."' Additionally, in the event the new
consideration is insufficient to pay the creditors in full, the transferee
shall make a pro rata distribution. 2
The transferee may perform his duty under section 6-106 in
any suitable manner; the section does not prescribe a procedure for
compliance. The parties may, for example, mutually agree that the
transferee retain a portion of the purchase price until the debts are
ascertained, deposit the consideration in an account subject to checks
bearing the transferee's counter-signature, or place the consideration
in an escrow account.13 But, if the transferee determines that pro-
cedures such as those outlined above are impractical, he may deposit
all or part of the purchase price with an appropriate court and inter-
plead the transferor's creditors.' 74 For those states enacting section
6-106 and not generally permitting statutory interpleader, the drafts-
men provided optional subsection (4) .17  Under this subsection, the
170. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-106(1).
171. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-106(2).
172. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-106(3).
173. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-106, Comment 3. For an interesting dis-
cussion of the use of an escrow fund, see Bjork v. United States, 486 F.2d 934
(7th Cir. 1973).
174. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-106, Comment 3.
175. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-106(4) ; see Note to subsection. Ten states
and the Virgin Islands have adopted this provision: Florida, Kansas, Maryland,
Montana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah and West Virginia. See
ANDERSON, supra note 31, at 470. Maryland has modified subsection (4) to read:
(4) The transferee may within ten days after he takes possession of the
goods file a petition in the circuit court for the county in which the place of
business of the transferor is situated or in the circuit court or Circuit Court
No. 2 of Baltimore City in case the place of business of the transferor is
situated in Baltimore City and pay the consideration into such court asking
that a receiver or receivers be appointed by said court to take charge of the
distribution of the agreed purchase price and the transferee may discharge his
duty under this section by giving notice by reigstered or certified mail to all the
persons to whom the duty runs that the consideration has been paid into that
court and that they should file their claims there. If said receivership is granted
then said receiver or receivers, upon qualification by filing an approved bond in the
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transferee may discharge his duty to the creditors of the transferor by
paying the proceeds of the transfer into the designated court within
ten days after taking possession of the goods and by giving notice to
all creditors that such payment has been made and that they should
file their claims with the court.
Auction Sales
The vast majority of Bulk Sales Acts did not expressly encom-
pass sales at public auction.1 7 Absent express inclusion, the courts
generally held that an auction sale need not comply with the Bulk
Sales Acts.1 7 7 Typically, the rationale for this exclusion was expressed
as follows:
[I]t is difficult to comprehend how a purchaser at such [auction]
sale can comply with the terms of the statute which require that
a buyer shall make inquiry of the vendor and demand an inventory
of him of his creditors and to send to each a ten days' notice of thebuyer's intended purchase and the amount of consideration to
be paid and the place where it is to be paid. It needs no further
discussion to demonstrate how absurd it would be to attempt tofit these requirements of the statute to a purchase made at a
public auction. 7 8
Although the transferee-bidder at an auction sale may not rea-
sonably be expected to perform the duties placed upon the transferee
who deals directly with the transferor, the unfettered freedom of a
debtor to effect a bulk transfer by public auction could work a severe
hardship upon his creditors.'7 9 The draftsmen of the Code, recognizing
amount fixed by the court, shall be entitled to the custody and distribution of the
agreed purchase price under orders of the court as in other receiverships.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 6-106(4) (1964).
176. See generally, DUESENBERG & KING, supra note 11, § 15.05[1]. Only Kentucky,
California and Illinois specifically included bulk sales by auction in their bulk sales
statutes. Note, Transactions Within the Bulk Transfers Act and Creditors Protected
Thereby, 43 IOWA L. REV. 572, 586 n.80 (1958).
177. See note 178 infra.
178. Schwartz v. King Realty & Investment Co., 93 N.J.L. 111, 115, 107 A. 154,
156 (1919), aff'd, 94 N.J.L. 134, 109 A. 567 (1920). Other courts relied upon thepublic nature of an auction sale to hold such sales exempt from bulk sales legislation.
Lowe v. Fairberg, 245 App. Div. 731, 280 N.Y.S. 615 (1935), aff'd, 270 N.Y. 590,
1 N.E.2d 344 (1936) ; Wolfe v. Bellfair Hat Co., 47 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
179. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-108, Comment 1. Although the New
York legislature recognized the possibility of evasion of the Bulk Sales Act by
auction sale, no corrective legislation was passed. See SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT AND
STUDIES OF JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 374 et. seq. (1940)(discussing an amendment that would have made the New York Act applicable
to arrangements between a seller and auctioneer).
[VOL. 35
1975] BULK TRANSFERS
these competing interests, 8 ° offered section 6-108 as an accommoda-
tion. This section imposes upon the auctioneer' essentially the same
obligations required of the transferee when the bulk transfer is not
made by auction sale.'8 2 Thus, the auctioneer must receive the list of
creditors from the transferor and retain it for six months after the
sale ;183 help prepare the schedule of property and retain it for six
months after the sale;"" and give notice of the auction, personally or
by registered or certified mail, at least ten days before the auction sale
to all persons shown on the list of creditors8 5 and to all other parties
known to him to hold or assert claims against the transferor. 8 1' And,
in the nineteen states that have enacted section 6-106, the auctioneer
must assure all creditors that the net proceeds of the auction will be
distributed in accordance with the provisions of that section.8 7
Two practical questions posed by auction sales are answered by
section 6-108. First, if the auctioneer fails to perform any of his
enumerated duties, the auction sale is still valid, and the purchaser
acquires good title.18 8  However, "if the auctioneer knows that the
auction constitutes a bulk transfer such failure renders the auctioneer
liable to the creditors of the transferor as a class for the sums owing to
180. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-108, Comment 1.
181. The term "auctioneer" is defined by the Code to include "[t]he person orpersons other than the transferor who direct, control or are responsible for the
auction . . . ." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-108(3). Additionally, section
6-108(4) stipulates that "[i]f the auctioneer consists of several persons their liability
is joint and several."
182. Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-104(1) with § 6-108(3).
183. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-108(3) (a). The list of creditors, in com-pliance with section 6-104(2) must be signed or sworn to by the transferor or
his agent.
184. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-108(3) (a). As required by section6-104(1) (b), the schedule of property must be sufficient to identify the transferred
property. Although section 6-108 does not expressly require that the auctioneerpermit the creditors of the transferor to inspect and copy the list of creditors
and schedule of property, such a duty may be inferred from the section. Unless
inspection and copying were permitted, there would be no reason for requiring the
auctioneer to retain the list and schedule. DUESENBERG & KING, supra note 11,
§ 15.05[2].
185. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-108(3)(b) and notes 101-117 supra
and accompanying text.
186. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-108(3)(b). The notice given by the
auctioneer is required only to state that the auction will take place. While thedate, time and place of such auction is not expressly required to be given in such
notice, prudence dictates that such details be given to avoid a challenge to the
effectiveness of the auction sale. See Forgey, supra note 84, at 458-59. No Codedecisions have been found in which the effectiveness of an auction sale has been
challenged.
187. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-108(3) (c).
188. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-108(4).
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them from the transferor up to but not exceeding the net proceeds of
the auction." ' 9 The sanction thus imposed upon the auctioneer is
severe. 90 Second, if the auctioneer does not know that the sale con-
stitutes a bulk transfer, he is not liable. No doubt in some instances,
as when the goods are simply received on consignment for sale, the
auctioneer may be unaware of the nature of the transfer. 9 ' Typically,
however, an auctioneer who accepts all or substantially all of a trans-
feror's inventory for sale at auction will have knowledge that the
auction sale constitutes a transfer in bulk. The Code's coverage of auc-
tion sales is a substantial contribution to the law of bulk transfers.
192
CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
Noncompliance with Article 6
Any bulk transfer subject to Article 6, unless made by auction
sale, in which the transferee fails to comply with the provisions of that
Article is declared to be "ineffective against any creditor of the trans-
feror,' '1 93 regardless of the good faith of the transferee. The word
"ineffective," undefined in the Code, appears to mean "voidable."' 9 4
The Bulk Sales Acts, by comparison, variously characterized a non-
complying bulk sale as "void,"195 "fraudulent and void,' 1 9 6 "presumed
189. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-108(4).
190. One commentator, comparing the liability of the auctioneer with that of the
transferee, has written: "Unlike the situation involving the private [bulk] sale,
however, the Code places a direct, personal liability on the auctioneer up to the
aggregate auction price obtained in the event of non-compliance ...." Lamey, supra
note 12, at 74; see Rapson, An Introduction to Articles 2 (Sales) and 6 (Bulk
Transfers) of the Uniform Commercial Code: Guidelines and Warnings for the
Practitioner, 35 N.Y.S.B.I. 417, 425 (1963).
191. See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
192. While the coverage of auction sales has been well received by commentators,
professional auctioneers criticized the inclusion of auction sales within the Bulk
Transfers Article. See N.Y. LAW REV. COMM'N HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 648 et seq. (1954). The absence of any reported Code decisions in-
volving auctioneer liability suggests that the fears of auctioneers were more fanciful
than real.
193. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 6-104, 6-105; see Starman v. John Wolfe,
Inc., 490 S.W.2d 377 (Mo. App. 1973).
194. See In re Dee's Inc., 311 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1962) ; cf., McKissick v.
Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 441 F.2d 811, 815 (5th Cir. 1971) (transfer in violation
of article 6 fraudulent and void as to creditor). The commentators generally agree
that the draftsmen intended no difference in result by the use of the term "ineffective"
instead of "voidable." See DUESENBERG & KING, supra note 11, § 15.08. See also
HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at 858; Barkin & Gilbert, supra note 106, at 168;
Commentary, supra note 11, at 287.
195. MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 38 (citing the statutes of eighteen states).
196. Id. (citing the statutes of seventeen states and the District of Columbia).
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to be fraudulent and void,""'9 or "prima facie evidence of fraud
and void."' 9
While terming a non-complying bulk sale void or fraudulent, the
Bulk Sales Acts generally did not provide statutory remedies to the
aggrieved creditors. Rather, the creditors were left to pursue their
remedies under local and federal rules of civil procedure. 9 9 Thus,
depending upon the jurisdiction, the aggrieved creditors could proceed
by the following remedies: (1) an action against the transferee for
the proceeds of the transfer, °° (2) execution levied directly against
the property in the possession of the transferee as if no sale had ever
taken place,201 (3) garnishment of the proceeds in the possession of
the transferee, 202 (4) attachment of the property in the possession of
the transferee, 20 3 (5) an injunction to prevent the proposed transfer 20 4
or (6) a petition for the appointment of a receiver for the transferred
property or an accounting of the proceeds. 2 5  Regardless of which
remedy the creditors pursued, they were not required to first have the
non-complying bulk sale judicially set aside.206
The Code follows the practice of the bulk sales statutes and does
not expressly grant any statutory remedies to the injured creditors.
Except in the section dealing with auctioneers, Article 6 contains no
provisions defining the nature and scope of the remedies of a creditor of
the transferor for noncompliance. Indeed, an Official Comment states:
[T]he sanction for non-compliance . . . is that the transfer is
ineffective against creditors of the transferor . . . . Any such
creditor or creditors may therefore disregard the transfer and
197. Id. (citing the statutes of eight states).
198. Id. (citing the statute of one state).
199. See HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at 858-59.
200. Boise Ass'n of Creditmen v. Glenns Ferry Meat Co., 48 Idaho 600, 283 P.
1038 (1930); Musselman v. Grossman, 46 Idaho 780, 271 P. 462 (1928).
201. Gallup v. Rhodes, 207 Mo. App. 692, 230 S.W. 664 (1921); J. C. Smith &
Wallace Co. v. Goldner, 92 N.J Eq. 504, 113 A. 487 (1921).
202. Wells v. Lindberg, 299 Ill. App. 624, 20 N.E.2d 363 (1939); Haralson
v. Mendel, 36 Ga. App. 174, 136 S.E. 88 (1926).
203. Courts often held that, unless the transaction was fraudulent, mere non-
compliance with the Bulk Sales Act did not give the creditors the right to attach
the sold property. See, e.g., C.M. Miller Co. v. Lunceford, 54 Ga. App. 21, 186
S.E. 766 (1936); Ainsworth v. Roubal, 74 Neb. 723, 105 N.W. 248 (1905);
J. H. Mohlman Co. v. Landwehr, 87 App. Div. 83, 83 N.Y.S. 1073 (1903).
204. See, e.g., Landers Frary & Clark v. Vischer Prods. Co., 201 F.2d 319
(7th Cir. 1953) (federal court, applying Illinois Bulk Sales Act, granted injunction
to creditor whose claim not then matured).
205. Caro v. Brachfeld, 163 N.Y.S. 511 (Sup. Ct. 1917); Semmes v. Ruediger,
195 Mo. App. 621, 187 S.W. 604 (1916).
206. See, e.g., Tipswood v. Doss, 273 Ill. App. 1 (1933); Mach v. Baum, 98
Misc. 607, 163 N.Y.S. 145 (1917); Dickinson v. Harbison, 78 N.J.L. 97, 72 A. 941
(1909).
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levy on the goods as still belonging to the transferor, or a receiver
representing them can take them by whatever procedure the local
law provides.20 7
The objecting creditor, therefore, will have to pursue the various
remedies provided under local and federal rules of civil procedure. 20 1
As noted by one writer, the remedy that the creditor elects will depend
on several factors: where the goods and the parties are located, who
has the proceeds of the transfer, whether the transferee intends to
satisfy the creditor's claim, the number of other creditors of the trans-
feree, and whether the creditor is a judgment creditor.2"9
The question then arises whether the creditors may successfully
proceed against the transferee on the rationale that a transferee is per-
sonally liable if he participates in a non-complying bulk transfer. Under
the various Bulk Sales Acts, the courts generally held that the pur-
chaser was not personally liable for failure to comply with the par-
ticular act.210 Rather, the purchaser's liability was limited to the value
of any property that he resold, or otherwise disposed of, or so com-
mingled with his own goods that the purchased goods could not be
identified.21 The decisions under Article 6 have followed the pre-
Code law. 212 Thus, where the purchase of a business did not comply
with Article 6 and the transferee had so commingled the merchandise
that it could not be segregated, a court imposed personal liability upon
the transferee for the creditors' claims.21 3 The measure of the creditors'
recovery was held to be the fair market value of the merchandise. 214
The commentators are in disagreement as to the effect of section
6-106,2" adopted in only nineteen states, upon the personal liability
207. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-104, Comment 2.
208. The various remedies outlined above, supra notes 200-205 and accompanying
text, generally remain available under Article 6. See, e.g., American Express Co.,
S.A.I. v. Bomar Shoe Co., 125 Ga. App. 408, 187 S.E.2d 922 (1972) (garnishment
of proceeds) ; Mclnvale v. Tifton Air Service, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 821, 168 S.E.2d 898
(1969) (levy against transferred property); Starman v. John Wolfe, Inc., 490
S.W.2d 377 (Mo. App. 1973) (action against transferee for proceeds of transfer
and garnishment) ; Rik Shaw Associates, Ltd. v. Bronzini Shops, Inc., 22 App.
Div. 2d 769, 253 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1964) (appointment of receiver).
209. Bennett, supra note 23, at 728.
210. See HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at 860; MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 42.
211. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 42.
212. In B & H Auto Supply, Inc. v. Andrews, 417 S.W.2d 341, 346 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967), the court, interpreting Article 6, explained: "The transferee has no
personal liability at all unless he converts the property to his own use or otherwise
defaults in his responsibility as receiver so as to place the property beyond the reach
of the creditors."
213. Starman v. John Wolfe, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 377 (Mo. App. 1973).
214. Id. at 385.
215. See notes 160-175 supra and accompanying text.
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of the transferee. Some writers have reasoned that failure to comply
with subsection 6-106(1), requiring the transferee to assure that any
new consideration is applied to the transferor's debts, merely renders
the transfer "ineffective." '21 6 The creditors are, under this construc-
tion of subsection 6-106(1), left to proceed in the usual manner
against the ineffectively conveyed goods. On the other hand, several
commentators have asserted that section 6-106, by imposing a duty
upon the transferee, grants creditors the right to hold the transferee
personally liable.217 In one of the few reported cases where the creditor
sought to hold the transferee personally liable for noncompliance with
Article 6, the creditor was aided in his argument by the language of
section 6-106.21 8 The transferee relied on pre-Code decisions provid-
ing that creditors could not hold the transferee personally liable for
noncompliance with that state's bulk sales statute. The court, noting
that section 6-106 changed this prior law, held the transferee person-
ally liable for the value of the property transferred or the amount paid
therefor.219
The further question arises as to the effect of a non-complying
bulk transfer upon the creditors' rights against subsequent purchasers
of any such property. Courts, interpreting the bulk sales statutes,
generally held the creditors could not pursue the property once in the
possession of subsequent good faith purchasers. 22' This rule of law
has been codified in section 6-110; when the transferee's title is sub-
ject to a defect because of noncompliance with Article 6, "a purchaser
for value in good faith and without such notice takes free of such
defect."'2 2' This protective rule is extended to good faith purchasers
for value at an auction.222  But, a subsequent purchaser who pays no
value 2 8 or who has notice2 2 4 of noncompliance takes the property
216. HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at 860; Barkin & Gilbert, supra note 106, at 168.
217. See Practical Approach to Article 6: Bulk Transfers, in U.C.C. CO-ORDINATOR
461, 480 (Willier and Hart eds. 1963).
218. Darby v. Ewing's Home Furnishings, 278 F. Supp. 917 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
219. Id. at 919.
220. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 48.
221. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-110(2).
222. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-108(4).
223. "Value" is broadly defined by the Code. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 1-201(44).
224. The word "notice" is defined by the Code in subjective and objective
terms. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(25). One commentary, however,
suggests that if a purchaser of property involved in a prior bulk transfer has no
specific knowledge of noncompliance, such person is not required to ascertain whether
the parties fully complied with Article 6. See generally, DUESENBERG & KING, supra
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subject to this defect. Of course, creditors, although unable to pursue
property in the possession of a subsequent good faith purchaser, retain
their remedies against the transferor and transferee where there has
been noncompliance with Article 6.
Finally, the question arises whether the transferor or transferee
may successfully assert noncomplance with the due notice to creditors
requirement as a basis for setting aside the bulk transfer. This question
was answered in Macy v. Oswald225 where the transferee sought to
set aside a bulk transfer on the theory that creditors had not been
notified of the transfer. The court held the transferee could not suc-
ceed because the notice provisions of Article 6 were solely for the
benefit of the transferor's creditors, stating: "[a] sale of goods in bulk
may be valid as between the parties although there has been no com-
pliance with the act." '226 The court did note, however, that if the con-
tract had contained an express condition that the sale must comply
with the provisions of Article 6, noncompliance would enable the
aggrieved party to avoid the transfer.2
Compliance with Article 6
Compliance with the formalities of Article 6 does not necessarily
insulate a bulk transfer from attack by the creditors of the transferor.
A conforming transfer may, nevertheless, be challenged under the
general provisions of the law of fraudulent conveyances if the trans-
feror's intent in disposing of his inventory was to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors.225
Further, regardless of the agreement between the parties to the
bulk transfer, the transferor's liability to his creditors is not dis-
charged by compliance with Article 6. In McClain v. Laurens Glass
Co.,22 9 a Georgia court emphasized this continuing liability of the
transferor. Despite the parties' compliance with the Georgia bulk
transfer law and the transferee's express assumption of the debts of
the transferor, the court permitted the creditors to proceed against
note 11, § 15.06. No Code decisions have been found where the title of a subsequent
purchaser for value has been challenged.
225. 198 Pa. Super. 435, 182 A.2d 94 (1962).
226. Id. at 439, 182 A.2d at 96.
227. Id. In the case, however, the contract contained no express condition that
the parties' failure to comply with Article 6 entitled the innocent party to rescind.
A prudent attorney for the transferee should insist on such an express condition.
228. See note 7, supra.
229. 127 Ga. App. 316, 193 S.E.2d 194 (1972).
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the transferor. In response to the transferor's defense of compliance
and discharge, the court stated:
[Article 6] has no language which compels the creditor of a
debtor who thereafter sells to another in bulk to look to the latter
for payment, whether or not as between the debtor and his trans-
feree there is an agreement that the latter will pay the debt, where
the original seller has not agreed to substitute the transferee in
the place of the purchaser and is a stranger to the contract be-
tween the latter. Its purpose is not to eliminate a remedy of the
original seller, but rather to protect him on a contractual indebted-
ness assumed to have been made at least partly on the implication
of solvency of the purchaser arising from his ownership of the
inventory of a going business. . . . But the act does not inhibit
these creditors, where the statute has been complied with, from
obtaining a judgment against the original purchaser who received
the goods and contracted with the supplier to pay for them; com-
pliance with its provisions merely prevents the creditors, after
judgment, from levying on property title to which has passed out
of the hands of the judgment debtor. 230
Statute of Limitations
The several Bulk Sales Acts contained different statutes of limita-
tions, ranging from ninety days to twelve months. 13 ' Because "Article
[6] imposes unusual obligations on buyers of property," the draftsmen
favored a short statute of limitations.13 1 Section 6-111, thus, provides:
No action under this Article shall be brought nor levy made more
than six months after the date on which the transferee took posses-
sion of the goods unless the transfer has been concealed. If the
transfer has been concealed, actions may be brought or levies made
within six months after its discovery.23
This section includes levies because of the breadth of sections 6-104
and 6-105, making a non-complying transfer "ineffective against any
creditor of the transferor." The foregoing language permits a creditor
who obtains a judgment against the transferor prior to the defective
transfer to levy upon the transferred property without instituting a
second "action." Pursuant to section 6-111, any such levy must be
230. Id. at 317, 193 S.E.2d at 195.
231. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 50. Many Bulk Sales Acts contained
no provision for tolling the statute of limitations when there had been concealment
of the bulk sale. See Raff, supra note 31, at 113.
232. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-111, Comment 1.
233. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-111. California, Florida and Georgia
amended Article 6 to increase the statute of limitation period from six months to
one year. Arkansas omitted section 6-111 entirely. ANDERSON, supra note 31, at 496.
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within six months "after the date on which the transferee took posses-
sion of the goods."" 4
Under the provision tolling the statute of limitations when "the
transfer has been concealed,"2 8 5 the question arises as to what consti-
tutes concealment. One court found no concealment where the trans-
feree, seeking to comply with the exemption provided in subsection
6-103(6), had agreed to become bound to pay the debts of the trans-
feror in full but had failed to give the requisite "public notice."2"' The
court was of the opinion that the exception to the six month statute
of limitations for concealment "refers to affirmative concealment, not
to mere non-disclosure or failure to give 'public notice.' "237 In con-
trast, a New York court has accorded a more expansive definition to
concealment. 23  That court held: "the transferee's complete failure
to comply with the notice provisions of Article 6 was tantamount
to a concealment of a transfer of assets within the meaning of section
6-111 ... . 239 Consequently, the court denied the transferee's
motion for summary judgment, finding a question of fact as to when
the creditor discovered the concealment..2 4  The breadth of this New
York interpretation appears to emasculate needlessly the normal six
month statute of limitations.
Two reasons may be advanced in support of the propriety of a six
month statute of limitations. A creditor who delays more than six
months after the bulk transfer is not likely to have relied upon the
goods transferred in extending credit to the transferor. Moreover, a
short statute of limitations will not unduly prejudice the rights of the
transferee since his title will be perfected within a reasonable time.
SUMMARY
The foregoing analysis of the Bulk Sales Acts discloses the widely
different conceptual approach, terminology and applicability of such leg-
islation as well as the conflicting judicial decisions inevitably spawned
by the diversity of these statutes. This history amply supports the
conclusion of the draftsmen of Article 6 that there was a manifest
234. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-111, Comment 2. See also DUESENBERG
& KING, supra note 11, § 15.08.
235. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-111.
236. Aluminum Shapes, Inc. v. K-A-Liquidating Co., 290 F. Supp. 356 (W.D.
Pa. 1968).
237. Id. at 358.
238. E. J. Trum, Inc. v. Blanchard Parfums, Inc., 33 App. Div. 2d 689, 306
N.Y.S.2d 316 (1969).
239. Id. at 317.
240. Id.
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need to simplify and make uniform the bulk transfer law. To this
end, Article 6 represents a giant step forward in the treatment of
bulk transfers. An examination of the reported Code decisions, rela-
tively few in number, suggests that the paucity of legal challenges to
the validity of bulk transfers is due to the fact that the parties involved
in the transfer have been able to satisfy the claims of the transferor's
creditors by careful compliance with the explicit requirements of Article
6 and by judicious use of the traditional escrow arrangement.
The Code's contribution to the reduction of litigation in the area
of bulk transfers may, in part, be attributed to the following: (1) the
clarification of the types of businesses and transfers that are subject to
Article 6, (2) the simplification of the information that must be com-
piled and kept available for creditors, (3) the extension of the advance
notice required in a bulk transfer to ten days, (4) the clarification of
the contents of the notice and the manner in which it is to be given,
(5) the express application of Article 6 to auction sales, (6) the ex-
plicit identification of creditors having rights under the various pro-
visions of Article 6, (7) the definition and clarification of the rights
of subsequent purchasers who acquire property from a transferee whose
title is subject to a defect because of noncompliance with Article 6,
and (8) the establishment of a six month statute of limitations with an
exception for a concealed bulk transfer.
Although Article 6 represents a substantial contribution to the
improvement of the legal and business environment in which bulk
transfers take place, the codification contains certain ambiguities and
weaknesses. The principal shortcoming of Article 6 lies in the drafts-
men's use of certain terms without definition. For example, no where
does the Code delineate what constitutes "a major part" of the inven-
tory, when an enterprise's "principal business" is the sale of mer-
chandise from stock, or when the transferee "pays for" the transferred
goods. Yet, the definition of each of these terms is essential to the
proper functioning of Article 6. Furthermore, 'Article 6 has unneces-
sarily broadened the definition of "creditors" to include those who hold
unliquidated claims and those who are not business creditors of
the transferor.
While commentators have correctly suggested that all is not per-
fect with Article 6 and that individual statutory variations have eroded
the principle of uniformity, the indisputable fact is that Article 6 works
well and is a valuable and important handmaiden to the business
community.
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